Abstract-The simple, computationally efficient HB-like entity authentication protocols based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem have attracted a great deal of attention in the past few years due to the broad application prospect in low-cost RFID tags. However, all previous protocols are vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack discovered by Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay. In this paper, we propose a lightweight authentication protocol named LCMQ and prove it secure in a general man-in-the-middle model. The technical core in our proposal is a special type of circulant matrix, for which we prove the linear independence of matrix vectors, present efficient algorithms on matrix operations, and describe a secure encryption against ciphertext-only attack. By combining all of those with LPN and related to the multivariate quadratic problem, the LCMQ protocol not only is provably secure against all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, but also transcends HB-like protocols in terms of tag's computation overhead, storage expense, and communication cost.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N the past few years, designing lightweight, unconventional, secure entity authentication schemes [1] - [4] for radio frequency identification (RFID) systems has been a hot topic in the cryptography and security communities due to the imperative practical demand and the formidable theoretical challenge. Typically, RFID systems consist of simple, low-cost tags that are attached to physical objects and powerful readers that queue data from tags. As a revolutionary efficient technique for automated identification of physical entities using radio frequency transmissions, RFID systems are employed in a wide variety of applications, such as supply chain management, payment, inventory monitoring, electronic password; and new applications are emerging every year. It is widely expected that RFID tags will inevitably replace barcodes currently affixed to most of our daily consumer products and RFID systems will prevail in the physical identification mechanism market.
The low production expenditure of RFID tags is critical and essential to the appealing of RFID systems [1] . Roughly speaking, RFID tag's price must be below ten cents to be considered affordable for most RFID applications [5] . On the other hand, there are a number of security and privacy challenges which have to be addressed before the prevalence of RFID systems. Secure and efficient entity authentication is a crucial one, because it is a natural approach to prevent counterfeiting-the severest attack to the identification devices. The low-cost RFID tags, which lack the computation, communication, storage, and energy capacities necessary for most conventional cryptographic primitives, call for new lightweight authentication schemes.
The HB-like authentication protocols [1] , [3] , [6] have gained much attention in this field. The lightweight computation requirement of imposing only bitwise operations on authentication participants, the solid security foundation on a well-studied learning parity with noise (LPN) hard problem, and their elegant security reduction proofs make them very attractive for entity authentication in the resource-constrained devices. Unfortunately, Ouafi et al. [7] discovered an advanced man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack, which is beyond the scope of the security modes used in [1] , [3] , and [6] , efficiently breaks down all HB-like protocols, and renders this kind of lightweight approaches like a dead end. Even though patching those HB-like protocols against this specific attack is possible, as we learn in the next section on the evolution of those protocols as well as enormous lessons on cryptographic algorithms and protocols, a solid dependable authentication protocol should be provably secure against general probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) attacks, while the efficiency in those protocols cannot be sacrificed.
Aside from the LPN-based approaches, SQUASH proposed by Shamir [4] might be tempting for RFID tags authentication, because of its simpleness and provable security equivalence to Rabin's public key encryption scheme. However, its security equivalence argument has been challenged by Ouafi and Vaudenay [8] . They successfully mounted an attack against a previous version of SQUASH: SQUASH-0, which uses a linear mixing function while SQUASH employs nonlinear mapping. Even though it is not clear how or whether this attack can be adopted to SQUASH, they demonstrated that the security equivalence claim between SQUASH and Rabin cryptosystem is invalid. The security of SQUASH remains an open problem.
Contribution
In this paper, we present a novel, efficient entity authentication protocol named LCMQ (standing for the combination of LPN, circulant matrix, and multivariate quadratic (MQ)), which 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE is especially suitable for RFID systems. By a general MIM model, we prove that it is secure against all PPT adversaries. The protocol security is still based on the hardness of the LPN problem, but the architecture cannot be categorized in the HB-like schemes. Instead, the protocol greatly benefits from the gentle properties and efficient algorithms of a special type of circulant matrix, to which the whole Section III is devoted. Furthermore, surprisingly, the protocol performance, in terms of computation, storage, and communication costs, outweighs all previous HB-like protocols, from the viewpoint of RFID tags, while it merely requires readers to additionally perform one extended Euclidean algorithm per authentication, which is trivial for supposedly powerful readers.
Notation
All vectors and matrices discussed in this paper are binary. Subsequently, the operations on the vectors and matrices are over the finite field . The following symbols will be used throughout the rest of the paper:
Bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation on two vectors (or matrices) and .
Inner-product of two vectors and .
Multiplication of two matrices and .
Concatenation of two vectors and .
Hamming weight of vector , that is, the number of ones in the bit vector.
Right cyclic shift operation on vector by position.
-bit vector in which all bits are zeros.
-bit vector in which all bits are ones.
-bit vector in which only bit at position is one.
Compliment of vector , i.e., .
Set of all -bit vectors except and .
Set of all vectors in
whose Hamming weights are even.
Set of all vectors in whose Hamming weights are odd.
Organization
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We begin with the definition of the LPN problem and the overview of an interesting journey of HB-like protocols in Section II. Then, Section III is focused on the technical core of the paper: a special type of circulant matrix, for which we prove the linear independence of matrix vectors, present efficient algorithms on matrix operations, and describe a secure encryption. After that, the LCMQ protocol is proposed and proven secure in a general MIM model in Section IV. We discuss the protocol's performance and recommend practical parameters in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PREVIOUS LPN-BASED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
A. LPN Problem
Suppose the tag preshares a secret -bit vector with the reader for subsequent authentications. First the reader randomly generates a sequence of binary vectors and transmits those challenges to the tag, which responds with , for accordingly. The reader accepts the tag's authentication if and only if . Unfortunately, after observing linearly independent challenge-response pairs of , an adversary can readily recover the authentication key by the Gaussian elimination.
In the presence of noise, however, where each response bit is independently flipped by a noise bit one with probability , determining becomes much more difficult. This problem is known as LPN problem. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (LPN Problem): View as a security parameter. Let be a -bit secret vector, be a noise level. For is a polynomial in , let be a -bit random vector, and be a noise bit that follows the Bernoulli probability distribution of parameter . Given and pairs , recover . The LPN problem has long been studied as the following equivalent problems: syndrome decoding problem [9] , [10] and minimal disagreement parity problem [11] . It has been proven that the LPN problem is NP-hard [10] . Moreover, finding a vector satisfying more than half of the challenge-response pairs, even though it looks like an easier problem, remains NP-hard [12] . Furthermore, Regev [13] introduced a natural extension of the LPN problem, referring to as the learning with error (LWE) problem, by generalizing binary field in the LPN problem into prime field , where is a prime number. Impressively, Regev [13] proved the reduction from worst-case lattice problems, such as shortest-vector problem, to the LWE problem. However, the reduction proof employs a quantum algorithm, which is, generally speaking, weaker than a classical reduction mechanism, as there is still no practical quantum computer available by now.
In reality, the security of LPN-based authentication protocols, similar to other NP-hard problems for application in the cryptography, still depends on the hardness of the average case of the LPN problem, while the NP-hard allegation only guarantees the intractability in the worst case. Intuitively, the combination of the key length and the noise level determines the security level of LPN instances. Blum et al. [14] provided the first subexponential algorithm (BKW algorithm) for the LPN problem, which requires equations/operations. Fossorier et al. [15] improved the BKW algorithm. At present, the fastest algorithm is the LF algorithm, another enhancement of BKM algorithm, presented by Levieil and Fouque [16] . According to the LF algorithm, a common parameter set for 80-bit security level is . Should LPN-based protocols be widely employed, it is highly likely that algorithms of the LPN problem will be improved notably, then bigger key lengths are demanded, as we have witnessed the significant increase of RSA (and discrete logarithm) public key length in the three decades. Since typical LPN-based protocols involve ( ) matrix multiplication, such big values of would incur considerable computation and implementation costs so as to push protocols away from lightweight. Fortunately, in our proposed protocol, LPN instances are encrypted by a succinct secure scheme so that the protocol does not suffer from the restriction and a practical value of key length can be as low as 163.
B. HB-Family Authentication Protocols
HB and
Protocols: In the HB protocol [17] , the tag and the reader have a secret vector in common. They interact rounds of two passes for authentication. In each round, the reader generates and sends a random binary vector as a challenge; then, the tag responds with the inner-product of the challenge vector and the secret , but with noise of probability on purpose. After rounds, the tag is authenticated provided the number of rejected challenge-response pairs is not greater than .
Assuming the intractability of LPN problem, the HB protocol is provably secure against passive eavesdroppers [1] , [6] . However, an active adversary can easily overcome the noise and then recover the secret : If the same challenge is repeated many times by the adversary, he can learn the error-free value of with overwhelming probability (JW attack) [1] . To defend against it, Juels and Weis [1] proposed the three-pass authentication protocol.
still involves rounds. One single round of is outlined in Fig. 1 . Similar to the HB protocol, after rounds, the authentication succeeds if less than responses do not match challenges.
Juels and Weis [1] presented an elegant reduction security proof of the protocol in a limited active model: detection-based-model, which is primarily addressing active attacks similar to the JW attack. Originally, the security proof of in [1] demands the sequential execution of rounds three-pass interactions. To overcome this limitation, Katz and Shin [6] brought a security proof of the protocol in the case of parallel and concurrent executions. Moreover, Katz and Smith [18] extended the reduction results to a larger range of noise levels whereas the Katz-Shin proof [6] holds only on the condition of . In spite of those gentle security proofs, Gilbert et al. [19] discovered a simple, effective MIM attack (referred to as the GRS attack), which is outside of the detection-based-model, and fully compromises the protocol. Even after a series of enhancement protocols, such as [20] , [21] , HB-MP [22] , modification of [23] , and [24] had been proposed, Gilbert et al. [25] demonstrated that those variants still could be attacked in the linear time while increasing the computational complexity and/or reducing the practicality. The PUF-HB protocol [26] and the Trusted-HB protocol [2] make use of a physically unclonable circuit and a lightweight hash function family, respectively, intending to thwart the GRS attack. However, the introduction of such ingredients into might not fully meet the motivation of designing lightweight simple-bit-operation-based authentication protocols. Moreover, Frumkin and Shamir [27] have broken the security of Trusted-HB in realistic scenarios. It is worth mentioning that an efficient authentication protocol originating from HB but actually based on pseudorandom number generator and error correction code was provided in [28] . Its information analysis and low complexity is impressive. Unfortunately, it is secure only against passive adversaries.
Randomand Protocols: Gilbert et al. [3] presented these two protocols, which are resistant to the GRS attack. In contrast to secret vectors in , Randomemploys two secret matrices and . One Randomauthentication consists of a blinding vector from the tag, a challenge vector from the reader, and then the tag's response vector , where is an -bit noise vector each bit of which independently follows the Bernoulli distribution of parameter . Similarly, the reader validates the tag's authentication iff does not exceed threshold . The binding/challenge vectors rather than matrices in exceedingly reduce the communication cost, but the secret matrices in Randomimposes too high storage burden to be practical in realistic systems. In order to overcome the drawback, they proposed to replace random matrices with Toeplitz matrices, which becomes the protocol. Gilbert et al. [3] defined a GRS-MIM-model, in which the MIM adversary is only allowed to manipulate the challenges from the reader to the tag, to prove that Randomand [3] are resistant to the GRS attack. In addition, Randomis provably secure in the detection-based-model, while is conjectured to be secure [3] . The security reduction proofs in [3] are rather impressive. However, the GRS-MIM-model does not simulate a full MIM adversary. At AsiaCrypt 2008, Ouafi et al. [7] presented a general MIM attack (referred to as OOV attack) against all current HB-like protocols, including Randomand , making the perspectives of secure LPN-based authentication protocols gloomy.
Noise Modes and Error Rates: For the HB-like protocols with the Bernoulli noise mode, there exist two types of authentication errors. A false negative, that is, the authentication of a legitimate tag being rejected, takes place when the number of incorrect responses exceeds the pass-threshold . By contrast, a false positive is defined that the number of unmatched responses out of random bits is less than the pass-threshold . In other words, we assume that an illegitimate tag only responses with random bits. The false negative rate and the false positive rate are determined [3] , [16] by (1) Since the Bernoulli noise mode would cause a certain false negative rate in HB-like protocols, a natural method to overcome that drawback is to demand the tag to generate a noise vector of bounded Hamming weight, that is , as discussed in [3] and [6] . We refer to it as the upper-bounded Binomial noise mode. Ouafi et al. [7] demonstrated another simple MIM attack (referred to as OOV2 attack) against HB-like protocols with this noise mode. For one iteration of Randomwith this noise mode, an OOV2 attacker manipulates the response such that the reader receives rather than , where is a random vector of Hamming weight 2. Let be the Hamming weight of the noise added by the tag. If and only if and the attacker flips two nonerroneous bits, which come from the only two nonzero elements in , in the response, the reader rejects the authentication. In other words, from one occurrence of rejection, the attacker learns two bits of / . Subsequently, all bits of secret matrices can be retrieved by conducting the process sufficient times.
III. LINEAR INDEPENDENCE, EFFICIENT COMPUTATION, AND ENCRYPTION SCHEME ON A SPECIAL TYPE OF CIRCULANT MATRIX
In this section, we state the main technique underlining the proposed protocol: a special type of circulant matrix named circulant-P2 matrix. First, let us review the circulant matrix. Traditionally, a circulant matrix is a square matrix in which each row vector is rotated one element to the right relative to the preceding row vector. That is, an ( ) square circulant matrix with first row vector is
Let be an integer in , we extend a circulant matrix to nonsquare cases, defining a landscape circulant matrix as an ( ) matrix in which each row vector is a right cyclic shift by one of the row vector above, and a portrait circulant matrix as an ( ) matrix in which each column vector is a right cyclic shift by one of the column vector before it, while referring to the original one as a square circulant matrix. . We list all P2 numbers less than 2048 in Table I .
A. Definition of Circulant-P2 Matrix
Definition of Characteristic Vector:
A characteristic vector of a square circulant-P2 matrix is defined as its first row vector. As for a landscape or portrait circulant-P2 matrix, since it is actually a truncated portion of a square circulant-P2 matrix, its characteristic vector is defined as the corresponding square circulant-P2 matrix's characteristic vector. For a circulant-P2 matrix with -bit characteristic vector , we denote square, landscape, and portrait cases by , , and respectively.
B. Linear Independence
Linear independence for vectors in a circulant-P2 matrix is the most important property for our proposed protocol and we discuss it as follows.
To facilitate discussions, we define an auxiliary term of a circulant-P2 matrix.
Definition 3 (Equivalence Class): For two vectors in (recall that is the set of all -bit vectors except and ), say and , if such that , then we define that and are cyclically shift equivalent and they are in an equivalence class.
An equivalence class can be represented by any one of its members.
Lemma 1: If is a prime number, then there are disjoint equivalence classes in . Each equivalence class contains elements. A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in [29] . Lemma 2: If is prime and 2 is a primitive element of finite field , then the polynomial is irreducible over . This lemma is proven in [30] . Lemma 3: If is a P2 number, then any elements in every equivalence class of are linearly independent. In other words, all row vectors in a landscape circulant-P2 matrix (and all column vectors in a portrait circulant-P2 matrix) are linearly independent.
Proof: Let ; we may view the square circulant matrix as a linear feedback shift register sequence of characteristic polynomial over finite field , according to [29] . Note that over . Let . Since is prime, according to Lemma 1, sequence has period . Thus, we only need to consider the following two cases. Proof: According to Lemma 3, any ( ) landscape circulant-P2 matrix has full rank: its rank is equal to . Therefore, it has a right inverse. The argument for left inverse of a portrait circulant-P2 matrix is same.
C. Matrix Operations
A good way to analyze operations on circulant-P2 matrices is to convert them to polynomials, as used in [31] . Every vector can be represented in a polynomial form, as described in the following definition. 10:
An efficient method of calculating the right inverse for a landscape circulant-P2 matrix is described in Algorithm 1. Main technique in Algorithm 1 is adopted from [31] , and we develop the solution for the case of being even. This algorithm applies to all kinds of circulant-P2 matrices' inverses if they exist.
Correctness 
E. A Secure Encryption Against Ciphertext-Only Attack
Definition 5: A symmetric-key encryption scheme based on circulant-P2 matrix is defined by: 1) Encryption:
where plaintext is an -bit random vector and , encryption key is randomly selected from , and subsequently ciphertext is an element in . 2) Decryption:
is performed via Algorithm 1. The sizes of plaintext space, key space, and ciphertext space are all the same: . Lemma 6: This encryption scheme is secure against ciphertext-only attack if plaintexts are randomly generated.
Proof: From the properties of circulant-P2 matrix, we can see that by choosing a random vector , a valid satisfying can always be retrieved via Algorithm 1; for any different , a different can be found to map them to any , and vice versa. If the plaintext is randomly generated every time, given a ciphertext, an adversary cannot learn any useful information about the encryption key and the plaintext, because each ciphertext is corresponding to distinct combinations of plaintext-key pairs. Thus, every plaintext/key is equally possible for any ciphertext. Therefore, the encryption is semantically secure against ciphertext-only attack when plaintexts are random.
In practice, a stand-alone encryption scheme only secure against ciphertext-only attack is rarely useful. However, coupled with the hardness of the LPN problem and HB construction, which can easily generate pseudorandom sequences, this scheme can lead to a succinct, highly efficient, and secure entity authentication scheme, which we will describe in next section.
IV. LCMQ PROTOCOL
A. Protocol Specification
The LCMQ protocol with the Bernoulli noise mode is illuminated in Fig. 2 . In this scheme, two -bit vectors and are shared by a tag and a reader as a pair of symmetric authentication keys with one condition that the parities of both keys' Hamming weights are known to the public. Because of the inherent requirement of circulant-P2 matrix that the interaction expansion should be less than the key length , and the impact of on false rates according to (1) , is recommended in most cases. Similar to conventional identification schemes, one LCMQ authentication procedure consists of two passes: a challenge by the reader and a response pair by the tag, rendering bits transmission payload. The computation in the tag's side mainly involves two vector/matrix multiplications of roughly XOR operations by a naive implementation, while the reader additionally, to calculate an inverse of a circulant-P2 matrix, needs to perform the extended Euclidean algorithm, which is surely a trivial requirement to the supposedly powerful reader. As we will argue later, would suffice to provide 80-bit security, and the LCMQ protocol achieves extraordinary performance in terms of all met- . Since the probability of such an event is negligible, equal to , tag need not bother to take this countermeasure. Note that it is impossible that since both and are in . If , the LCMQ protocol fails, but such a case only takes place with the negligible probability . Therefore, we can safely presume that it would never happen and will not consider it in the rest of the chapter for simplicity.
Security Implication: The proposed LCMQ protocol, though it is still LPN-based, has a different structure from the HB-like protocols [1] , [3] . By the encryption , protocol LCMQ conceals the LPN answer from adversaries such that it can use a smaller key length, which is a vital factor to determine protocols computation and communication performance. More importantly, the encryption/decryption operations provide an implicit integrity mechanism for . Benefited from linear independence of circulant-P2 matrix vectors, any alteration on will render the authentication to fail with an overwhelming probability, so does the case of manipulating . In addition, there is no correlation effect of simultaneously manipulating , , (The error bits introduced by changing one can be canceled off, to a notable extent, by the error bits from altering others.) Thus, the LCMQ protocol overcomes the flaws in the HB-like protocols [1] , [3] that leave them subject to the OOV attack.
B. Security Models Definitions
To formally define security models, we denote an LCMQ authentication system by a pair of probabilistic functions ( ), namely a tag function and a reader function .
1) Definition of Adversary's Advantage:
The fundamental objective of an adversary in the entity authentication protocol is to impersonate a legitimate tag. By replying a random vector as an authentication response, the probability that an adversary impersonating the tag will success is the false positive rate . This is the best soundness error that we can achieve for an authentication protocol. Therefore, we define the advantage of an adversary against LCMQ in a model as its overall success probability over in impersonating the tag.
2) DET-Model: Definition 6 (DET-Model):
In the DET-model, which is identical to the detection-based-model used in [1] , [3] , [6] , and [18] , the DET attack is carried out in two phases: -Phase 1: Adversary interacts times with . On the th invocation, takes a challenge vector from as input, selects a random vector , generates a noise vector according to the Bernoulli noise mode, and calculates . Furthermore, internally generates a random -bit vector , and computes . Then, and are transmitted to . -Phase 2: Adversary receives a random challenge from , and then outputs corresponding to , intended to pass the verification of with advantage
3) MIM-Model: Definition 7 (MIM-Model):
In the MIM-model, the MIM attack is conducted in two phases: -Phase 1: Adversary manipulates any communications between and for executions. Fig. 3 depicts the th manipulation, which simulates a full MIM attacker. We define three interference vectors:
and . -Phase 2: Adversary receives a random challenge from , and then outputs corresponding to , intended to pass the verification of with advantage The MIM-model is a very strong security from the adversary's perspective and it is easy to see that the DET-model is a limited version of the MIM-model. An authentication protocol provably secure in MIM-model will naturally resist all PPT attacks. In the following, we first provide a concrete security reduction proof from the DET-model to the MIM-model for the LCMQ protocol; then, we prove its security in the DET-model based on the hardness of the LPN problem, with some reasonable assumptions.
C. Reduction From DET-Model to MIM-Model Theorem 1:
If there is an adversary attacking the LCMQ protocol in the MIM-model, modifying executions of the protocol between an honest tag and an honest reader, running in time , and achieving , then there exists an adversary attacking the LCMQ protocol in the DETmodel, interacting at most oracle queries, running in time , and achieving for some negligible function , under the assumption that and are negligible. Hence, if protocol LCMQ is secure in the DET-model, then it is provably secure in the MIM-model.
Proof: In Phase 1, can readily simulate the honest tag for since has access to . Therefore, we only need to simulate for . Similar to the proof method for the Randomprotocol [3] , launches Phase 1 of adversary and simulates the tag and the reader times as follows : 1) sends a random vector as the challenge of the simulated reader, and let modify it to ; then forwards to . 2) faithfully responds with to , which relays to . Then alters them to , and uses as the authentication response to . 3) During the interactions, if or or , terminates the iteration and proceeds with the next, abiding by the protocol specification. 4) If and and , outputs "ACCEPT" to as the authentication result of the simulated reader; if and and and is odd, outputs "ACCEPT" too; elsewise, it outputs "REJECT". After Phase 1, launches Phase 2 of . Since Phase 2 in the DET-model is identical to that in the MIM-model, just
replicates 's behavior with the real reader, with the same objective of passing the authentication. Therefore, if achieves , then the probability of successfully impersonating a valid tag is equal to the success probability of , i.e., , on the condition that the reader is correctly simulated by in Phase 1. We denote by the probability of wrongly simulating the reader for in one iteration of Phase 1. Executions in Phase 1 can be divided into four different cases:
Case 1: and and : In this case, outputs "ACCEPT" and fails at simulating the reader with a probability equal to the false negative rate .
and But : Thus, . Since , the authentication result in this case is equivalently decided by Let (3) be the error vector added by by changing .
If , according to Lemma 3, all column vectors in the portrait circular-P2 matrix are linearly independent. Following the same argument in Theorem 2 of [6] , is uniformly distributed over , as the column vectors of are linearly independent. Thus, the resulting error vector follows the uniform distribution over since has no extra knowledge about the random noise vector . As a result, the probability of wrongly outputting "RE-JECT" is exactly the same as the false positive rate . If and is even, then , and the probability of wrongly outputting "ACCEPT" is exactly . When and is odd, then . Consequently, the probability of wrongly outputting "REJECT" is , which is always less than since . Overall in this case, . If both and are not equal to , since , and cannot choose a valid pair of ( satisfying or without knowledge of , then is still uniformly distributed oven . As a result, in this case, erroneously outputs "REJECT" with probability .
and at least one of and is Not Equal to : This case is the combination of Cases 2 and 3, and the authentication result is determined by where and are defined in (3) and (4), respectively. Applying the deductions in the previous two cases, and are uniformly distributed over . Because used in (3) and used in (4) are independent, and these is no relation between and , then is still uniformly distributed over . Consequently, the probability of wrongly outputting "REJECT" is . Summing all cases up, fails at simulating the reader in one execution at most with probability . Thus, the probability of correctly simulating the reader in Phase 1 is not less than , and adversary impersonates a valid tag at least with probability . Therefore, can achieve advantage With properly chosen parameters such that and are negligible, if is nonnegligible, then is nonnegligible. Thus, if the LCMQ protocol is secure in the DET-model, then it is secure in the MIM-model.
D. Security in the DET-Model
We first prove that the intractability of the LPN problem implies the pseudorandomness of in the LCMQ protocol, and then use it to prove the LCMQ protocol's security in the DETmodel.
The following probability distributions are used in the deductions.
1) : the distribution of -bit vector in which each bit independently follows the Bernoulli distribution of parameter .
2)
: for , the distribution of -bit string:
3) : the distribution of -bit string:
Lemma 7: Assuming the intractability of the LPN problem and Artin conjecture [32] , and are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms.
Proof: Lemma 1 in [6] has proven that if is uniformly chosen from in and , then and are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms, assuming the intractability of the LPN problem. Notice that Lemma 1 in [6] imposes no restriction of having to be a prime number satisfying 2 is a primitive element of . Apparently, the discrepancy between and is ignorable. As for the requirement of being prime, it is trivial according to the prime number theorem, which describes the asymptotic distribution of the prime numbers. Moreover, even though there is no deterministic number theory result regarding the distribution of a special class of prime number satisfying 2 is a primitive element of , according to Artin conjecture [32] , the set of such primes is infinite and its density inside the set of primes is equal to Artin's constant, which can be expressed as an infinite product Therefore, we conclude that and are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms. are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms, then is random from the perspective of any PPT adversary in the DETmodel. Even though an adversary now can freely choose in the LCMQ protocol, this encryption is still secure against . To see this point, we can think in this way: During th invocation of Phase 1 in the DET-model, may respond to the adversary's challenge with ; regardless of any value of , the decryption result follows the uniform distribution over . In this regard, it simulates the action by from the point of view of . In other words, we here use a random oracle: the real value of does not come from , but is determined by the decryption result
. Clearly, those random responses will not leak any useful information to . Now proceeds with Phase 2, required to output corresponding to a random challenge . The only solid chance that can pass the authentication is that appears as at least one of challenges in Phase 1. This event happens with negligible probability Otherwise, if is different from all 's, as we have proven in Cases 3 and 4 of Theorem 1, only can pass the authentication with probability . Therefore, no PPT adversary can achieve nonnegligible advantage, and the LCMQ protocol is secure in the DET-model, assuming the hardness of the LPN problem.
V. PROTOCOL PARAMETER SELECTIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Hardness of LCMQ Instances in the DET-Model
According to the LCMQ security proof in the DET-model, will suffice to provide -bit security (Adding one bit in the key length is due to the fact that the parities of and are known to the public.) and the precise value of noise level seems insignificant as long as there are noises. Of course, this is only because we use LPN instances as a random oracle in the proof of Theorem 2. Essentially, the fundamental problem that an adversary confronts in the DET-model is described as follows. , secret , and the parity of 's Hamming weight are public, the noise-free LCMQ instances of (5) effectively constitute an MQ system in variants. We define such an MQ system as an circulant-P2-matrices generated MQ system.
Example: For , an circulant-P2-matrices generated MQ system is where .
Those noise-free LCMQ instances are related to another hard problem-the MQ problem [33] .
Definition 9 (MQ Problem): Given a system of quadratic equations in variables over a finite field, find a valid solutions satisfying all equations.
Generally speaking, the hardness of MQ problem depends on the relative values of and . When , it is a trivial case and a solution can be readily retrieved. If is significantly smaller than , as an underdefined system, finding a solution is fairly easy [34] . When is much greater than , as an overdefined system, the MQ Problem becomes easy too. Specifically, if there are (for ) or (for all other finite fields) linearly independent equations available, the MQ problem can be solved by linearization of running time [35] . For general values of and , the MQ problem is known to be NP-hard, even for quadratic equations oven [33] , [36] . This problem has been used as the security foundation of cryptographic algorithms, such as the UOV [37] and Sflash [38] signature schemes, and the QUAD [35] stream cipher.
It is clear that the LCMQ problem is essentially a circulant-P2-matrices generated MQ system with noise. The name of LCMQ is exactly derived from the combination of LPN, CM, and MQ. Because of the nice linear independence property of circulant-P2 matrices, solving this noise-free MQ system generally needs equations. On the other hand, in Section II-A, we have learned that a little noise ingredient turns a simple solving-linear-equation task into an NP-hard problem, for which only subexponential algorithms are discovered. Since breaking the LCMQ problem requires a chain of solving the LPN and MQ problems, its computational complexity is equal to the product of the complexity of those two hard problems. In fact, the LCMQ problem of parameter , with a same noise level, should be harder than the LPN problem of parameter because noise in the LCMQ problem is encrypted and then is expanded all over . Therefore, we are highly confident that there is no subexponential algorithm solving the LCMQ problem, and an adversary only can rely on exhaustive search (matching in the middle) to recover the two -bit keys.
B. Parameters Recommendation and Comparisons
As we argued, with small noise level is sufficient for -bit security in the DET-model. On the other hand, the security proof in the MIM-model demands negligible false rates, ruling out too small choices of . To be concrete, those false rates should not exceed . In practice, the LCMQ protocol may use the upper-bounded Bernoulli noise mode, which eliminates the false negative. Although the HB-like protocols with this noise mode are vulnerable to the OOV2 attack (see Section II-B), it can be safely used in the LCMQ protocol, because we have proven the LCMQ protocol's security against this kind of MIM attack. Recall the false positive rate ; thus, should always be in practice. Based on all those arguments, we recommend the following protocol parameters for different security levels in Table II. Using those parameter selections, we compare the LCMQ protocol key size with traditional cryptographic primitives in Table III . The key sizes of RSA and DSA are quoted from NIST As we see in Table II , ( ) can provide 80-bit security in the LCMQ protocol. In contrast, the LF algorithm [16] , as the best algorithm to solving LPN instances by far, renders the HB-like protocols to take with noise level . Therefore, the LCMQ protocol outperforms all HB-like protocols in terms of metrics of storage, tag's computation, communication, and implementation while provably preventing all PPT attacks. All of those make it very attractive as a lightweight, reliable, secure entity authentication for low-cost devices.
C. Discussions
Two-as-One Variation: If the performance is ridiculously vital for some applications and thus a smaller value of is desired while the security level is allowed to slightly sacrifice, a variation of LCMQ protocol, by combining two paralleled authentications as one, might be of help. In this variation, the reader sends two vectors as challenge, and then tag responds with . Consequently, the reader verifies the authentication by checking . A parameter set as low as with the upper-bounded Bernoulli noise mode can be used. This variation does not affect the security proofs in the DET-model, but the security proof in the MIM-model encounters issues. Even though it is true that for that parameter set, in Theorem 1 is no longer equal to , but notably bigger than it, as an adversary may manipulate only one set of and . Nevertheless, the variation may be helpful for extremely resource-constrained systems, and we recommend ( ) for 80-bit security.
Different Lengths of and : Technically, the two keys and can have different lengths, say and bits, respectively, as long as and are P2 numbers and . However, from the perspective of implementation, it is more convenient to make them same so that only 1-D matrix multiplication is required rather than two.
Embedding ID Into Challenge: From the security proofs of the LCMQ protocol, we can see that challenge does not need to be random; instead, being unique would suffice for . Thus, a reader can use a nonce (number used once) as a challenge. In addition, the identity of the tag to be verified can be implicitly embedded as part of a challenge vector, which is very useful in practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a lightweight, efficient, practical, and secure entity authentication protocol for RFID systems. Built on the LPN problem, a special type of circulant matrix named circulant-P2 matrix, and the MQ problem, the proposed LCMQ protocol presents competitive advantage over all previous HB-like protocols in terms of the provable security in a general MIM model and the tag's computation, storage, and communication costs. As a technique core of the paper, the vector linear independence, gentle properties, and efficient algorithms on matrix operation of circulant-P2 matrix may also be used to construct other cryptographic primitives and secure protocols. That would be an interesting research direction.
